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The projection and measurement of cyberpower
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Abstract Cyberspace and cyberpower are terms that are increasingly used in common parlance,
but are notoriously difﬁcult to deﬁne and measure. This article builds on previous work deﬁning
the properties of cyberspace in terms of vertical layers, which when combined with a representa-
tion of distance presents a three-dimensional model. The unique attributes of cyberspace can be
harnessed for power projection, the aim of which is ultimately to alter the behaviour of indivi-
duals. Although cyberspace has yet to be used as a medium to demonstrate conventional hard
power of coercion and threats supported by physical force, it does present a suitable medium for
the projection of soft power of attraction and imitation. These are deﬁned within the context of the
online environment and by drawing on the techniques used to optimise Web-based commerce,
potential methods of implementing and measuring the success of a campaign of cyberpower pro-
jection are proposed.
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Power and Cyberpower
According to Dahl (1957), the aim of a campaign to project power and inﬂuence is to
affect the behaviour of people such that A can be regarded as having power over B to the
extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. This was
expanded on by Nye (2010), who in noting that the concepts are elusive to deﬁne and
measure, describes their aim as being to affect the behaviour of an individual to act in a
way that they would not otherwise do, to shape the preferences of others by determining
their wants or by setting agendas through external actions or persuasion. This power can
be targeted as precisely as to a single individual or small group, such as the European
Union sanctions against the leadership in Zimbabwe (BBC News, 2002) or to an entire
population as exempliﬁed by radio propaganda broadcasts during the Second World War
(Concho, 2004).
Traditionally a state’s national power was considered to be dependent upon factors such
as geography, national resources, population size or wealth as these were regarded as
the constituent elements required for the creation of military power (Tellis et al, 2000).
The ability of a nation to be able to protect its own borders from attack while demonstrably
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threatening a neighbour was seen as the ultimate symbol of national strength. In the post-
industrial age, deﬁnitions of national power began to introduce the notion of a knowledge
revolution that foreshadowed the growth in importance of the role of information technology
and innovation in society. However, Tellis et al (2000) comments that these were ultimately
seen as contributory factors in the generation of a country’s ﬁnancial wealth that could be
converted into military capability if needed.
The emergence of cyberspace and the concept of cyberpower require an evaluation of the
deﬁnition of how power and inﬂuence can be projected in an interconnected world.
As cyberspace has no physical boundaries, nations do not have territory to protect or ways
to threaten a neighbour’s borders and natural resources using the conventional deﬁnitions of
power projection. Therefore new ways are needed to be able to deﬁne power in order to be
able to use the medium to inﬂuence and shape the behaviour of others. Deﬁning cyberspace
has attracted much debate, particularly for the military, which is keen to emphasise its
uniqueness to attract new funding in order to explore the opportunities it has to offer.
The UK Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (2013) and US
Department of Defence (2007) provide similar descriptions emphasising its interdependence
on a range of constituent elements such as networks, computer systems and embedded
controllers. A different approach is however proposed by Sheldon (2011), who deﬁnes
cyberspace in terms of four vertical layers, which are described as follows with proposed
indices of how they can be measured.
Infrastructure layer: The physical aspects of cyberspace, which incorporates compu-
ter hardware, servers, networking components, cabling, satellites and other dedicated
facilities. This also includes those devices that users interact with, such as PCs, laptops,
tablets and smart phones. This layer could be measured by the proportion of the
population with access to the Internet, average time between users upgrading hardware,
levels of smart phone ownership, the number of Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
relative to the population and the number of international gateways providing global
connectivity.
Physical layer: Features that are governed by physics and comprise the properties
associated with the transfer of data across the infrastructure layer. These include the
characteristics of the electromagnetic spectrum such as the passage of photons in ﬁbre-
optic cables, electrons in cablings and wireless propagation from short-range Bluetooth
communication to international satellite links. Measurements of this layer could incorpo-
rate the proportion of the nation served by copper cable compared with high-speed
ﬁbre-optic cable, number of Wi-Fi hotspots per head of population, mobile phone
coverage, average data consumption per subscriber and the cost of access compared with
average national salary.
Syntactic layer: The manner in which data is formatted to facilitate communication
between and within components of the infrastructure layer. This includes communication
protocols, software components and network routing algorithms. Measurements could
include the level of encryption routinely employed, the proportion of computers protected
by anti-virus and the levels of infected machines, degree of network prioritisation (Net
neutrality) and the number of Domain name registrations.
Semantic layer: This component enables human users to make sense of the information
and for it to become useful to them. This includes elements such as the type and popularity of
user interfaces, application software, as well as the linguistic, cultural and human factor
Venables et al
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considerations employed in their design. Measurement indices include the proportion of
gross domestic product from online business, percentage of web pages produced in the
indigenous language, percentage of population who are active social network users, levels of
cybercrime and the amount and effectiveness of legislation and enforcement.
To this four-layer model of cyberspace, we add an additional human element as we
consider it fundamental to the nature and understanding of cyberspace and cyberpower. This
is because the domain is dependent upon man and, unlike the other environments with which
it is often compared, land, sea, air and space, it requires human intervention for its creation,
maintenance, exploitation and ultimately its destruction. Furthermore, the interpretation of
the semantic layer, which provides information that is useful and understandable to human
operators, has to be variously tailored to suit the needs of the end user and will need to
accommodate factors such as language and culture. This has been recognised with the
development of human–computer interaction as a multidisciplinary ﬁeld in which psychol-
ogy and other social sciences unite with computer science and related technical ﬁelds with
the goal of making computing systems that are both useful and usable.
When viewed in this context cyberpower can be described in terms of the level of control
of these layers, noting that power over one does not result in governance of all. The ability to
quantitatively measure a range of variables within each layer could be used to produce a
comparative index of power. These could then enable a relative position against an economic
competitor or military adversary to be calculated. Speciﬁc areas that are shown to be
comparatively weak can then provide an indication of where effort needs to be concentrated
to improve performance.
In addition to deﬁning cyberspace in terms of vertical layers, it can also be considered
horizontally in terms of Near, Mid and Far geographic operating space. These are described in
Table 1 and are based on those deﬁned in the UK Ministry of Defence’s ‘Cyber Primer’
(MoD, 2013a, b). Control of the local Near space is vital to protect national or local interests
and through the ‘no man’s land’ of Mid space, power is projected into Far space, which will be
the Near space of a target country or competitor. An analysis of an adversary’s strengths and
weaknesses in each of these three areas can provide information on possible attack vectors that
can be utilised to reduce their inﬂuence and ability to operate freely in cyberspace.
In combining these ﬁve layers with the concepts of Near, Mid and Far space, cyberspace
can be redeﬁned in three dimensions as shown in Figure 1. This can be used to illustrate that
although cyberpower may be exercised in some elements of the domain, it does not
guarantee control of all, and that some techniques targeting a particular aspect may only have
a limited overall effect against an adversary. This model also enables attacks to be
Table 1: The three horizontal layers of cyberspace
Environment Description
Near space Local networks and systems that are considered vital to support critical national infrastructure and
services and are assumed to be controlled and protected by national or governmental agencies
Mid space Networks and systems critical to access global cyberspace but over which there is no local control or
protection. Typically these may be geographically distant and owned by a foreign commercial
company or a third party state
Far space Networks and systems that form a competitor or adversary’s near space and which must be inﬂuenced
or controlled as part of a campaign to project power and inﬂuence through cyberspace
The projection and measurement of cyberpower
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appreciated in terms of their intended areas of effect and for the defender an appreciation of
where the greatest risk to their organisation lies.
To demonstrate how our model of cyberspace can be applied in practice, Table 2
illustrates how each component can be deﬁned in terms of a national government’s attempt
through the use of video clips on social media to inﬂuence European-born Jihadists who have
travelled to the Middle East to return to the West. In this case the targets have been identiﬁed
as predominantly using mobile telephony and are active on a variety of social media
platforms. Of note is the inclusion of anonymous hacktivists operating in Mid Space who
have been active in the disruption of extremist media platforms through their #OPIsis
campaign (Sullivan, 2015).
The Development of Soft Power in Cyberspace
Control of the vertical and horizontal layers of cyberspace described above is fundamental to
enable power and inﬂuence to be exerted. This can be directed both inwards towards a local
target population in Near space as well as to a target in Far space. The ability to effectively
Figure 1: Three-dimensional model of cyberspace.
Table 2: Illustrative components of cyberspace
Near space Mid space Far space
Human Government Employee ‘Anonymous’ Hacktivist Jihadist
Semantic Video production Software Routing software Social media application
Syntactic MPEG-4 video format Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/
Internet Protocol (IP)
MPEG-4 video format
Physical Electrons in Ethernet cable
and light in ﬁbre-optic
cable
Light in ﬁbre-optic cable and radio
frequency communication within
satellite and microwave links
Radio frequency
communication within
mobile telephone
networks
Infrastructure Video production suite,
desktop computer and
Local Area Network
Microwave and satellite link, ﬁbre-optic
undersea cable and ISP infrastructure
Mobile telephone network
and smart phone
Venables et al
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translate cyberpower into an effect in the physical domain requires a clear understanding of
what objectives are desired and how success or failure can be determined. Any cyber strategy
must be fully coherent with the wider policy aims of the physical world as cyberspace and
cyberpower do not exist in isolation and any actions must be part of a wider political
objective and campaign plan.
Projecting power through cyberspace differs from that of the traditional concept of military
‘hard’ power, which seeks to change behaviour through direct inducements of threats and
coercion (Nye, 2010). Although methods of measuring the potential effectiveness of
conventional military forces based on their known or estimated capability are well established,
to date there has not been a fully attributed nation on nation cyber attack (Rid, 2012). This has
led analysts to only be able to speculate on a country’s capabilities and how a cyber conﬂict
may unfold and what effects may be achieved. However, several countries have already stated
that they are engaged in the militarisation of cyberspace, indicating that they are preparing to be
able to engage in offensive cyber operations, which may act as a credible deterrent to future
attacks. The UKMinistry of Defence (2013a, b) has announced its intention to build a counter-
attack capability and China has reportedly had cyber warfare units since 2003 with the US
Cyber Command achieving an initial operating capability in 2013 (Nato, 2009).
An alternative to the methods of military hard power to achieve national objectives is to
adopt the concept of soft power developed by Nye (1991). Soft power targets human factors
and aims to ‘get others to want the outcomes that you want’ through the power of attraction,
which includes non-material means such as culture, political values and foreign policies
(Treverton and Jones, 2000). After a decade of military operations in the Middle East, which
it may be argued has produced unclear outcomes, the beneﬁts of soft power as the policy of
attraction over coercion are seen as offering an alternative means to achieve national
objectives. According to Nye (2004), the countries that are most likely to gain soft power
should display the following three attributes to optimise their attraction on the global stage:
● Their dominant culture and ideas should align to the prevailing global norms, which include
liberalism, pluralism and autonomy. This sets the standard to which other countries might
seek to attain, including a structure that enables free debate and an active engagement across
a range of diverse topics with individuals able to make informed, un-coerced decisions.
However, these can be viewed as being very much western ideals and it can be argued that to
gain soft power in countries without these traditions or ambitions it is necessary instead to
meet local norms that the target population may be familiar with and aspire to.
● Second, to be able to effectively disseminate the desired message it is necessary to have
access to multiple channels of communication to enable inﬂuence to be exerted over a
wide range of media. To provide a coherent message, this must be available through the
entire range of media types that the target has access to.
● Finally, for a country to gain soft power, it must be seen to be credible in terms of its domestic
and international performance so as to be attractive to the target it wishes to inﬂuence.
This requires the inﬂuencing country to be highly regarded, trustworthy and be seen to
have a good reputation on the world state in terms of its national values and behaviour.
Further research by Kroenig et al (2010) into the concept of soft power suggests that to be
successful, states must communicate to their intended targets in a ‘functioning market place
of ideas’ where there is a competition of messages free from state inﬂuence. This would
The projection and measurement of cyberpower
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include such forces and mechanisms as censorship and propaganda. In addition, they
propose that the target must be potentially receptive to the message, which must be credible,
attractive, repeated and contain emotional content. It must therefore be a carefully tailored
campaign directed at those who are amenable to the message and be able to inﬂuence
decision makers. However, as noted by Hall and Smith (2013), soft power cannot
compensate for what may be regarded as other unattractive national policies as has been
seen in China, where despite a substantial investment in soft power projection, evidence has
been used to demonstrate that it has had little or no positive effect on how the country is
perceived by its neighbours.
The role of soft power in the projection of the UK’s national power was recognised in
2013 by the appointment of a House of Lords Committee to determine how it could be
deployed in the national interest. The ability of cyberspace to reach large numbers of people
was highlighted in the report by the rise in urbanisation leading to large concentrations of
people in relatively small areas becoming intimately connected by electronic means and
more aware of 24-hour broadcasting and social media (House of Lords, 2014a). The impact
of this was highlighted by Fuchs (2012) in the role of BlackBerry Messenger and Twitter in
the 2011 London riots, with both the Prime Minister and Home Secretary making particular
reference to their role in organising the disturbances and countering the Police reaction. The
link between rolling news services and social media was also more recently exempliﬁed by
Whitehead and Evans (2014) when a Qatari airliner was subject to a hoax bomb threat.
Although the passengers were not told of the situation, it was broadcast on national news and
subsequently on Twitter, which was being monitored by those on board. It is signiﬁcant that
in this potentially dangerous situation, those most affected were not being informed of events
by the ﬂight crew, but by journalists and members of the public on the ground.
Although soft power is clearly an attractive concept, the battle for hearts and minds in a
cooperative framework only works when the target is amenable to the message. Examples in
which it has failed include Kuwait in 1991 when only decisive military force was effective
and it has been noted by Greenwald (2010) as so far having a negligible effect on Islamic
militants in the Middle East. Using the example of Russian activity in Georgia and Ukraine
he noted that it also has a tendency to fail when the target is able to either block or effectively
counter the message with its own information campaign. Furthermore, once it becomes clear
that there is no plan to recourse to hard power, either economic or military, a policy that
relies on soft power alone will fail, with the result that an adversary will take advantage of a
lack of a credible military threat for their own ends.
These limitations of deploying soft power alone were recognised by Nye (2009) in the
development of the concept of smart power, which is the combination of hard power
coercion and payment with the soft power attributes of persuasion and attraction – the use of
carrot and stick, which to be most effective should be mutually reinforcing. Thus the
effective use of technology and information combined with conventional military power can
act as a force enabler so long as their strengths and limitations are well understood.
Projecting Power in Cyberspace
Although conventional military hard power that results in direct destruction and harm
through cyberspace has yet to be demonstrated, the use of intimidation and coercion to exert
Venables et al
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power has been ably demonstrated by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) through
its media campaign (Lister, 2014). Directly in contravention of the traditional theory of soft
power’s attraction and appeal to wider cultural norms, their prominent videos of beheadings
and the promotion of an extremist ideology have been widely disseminated. By broadcasting
news of their latest atrocity around the world through multiple channels, including the
Internet, their message has been further disseminated through social media and blogs. This
effectively increases their exposure beyond their initial audience, with the opportunity to
reach future potential converts to their cause. Images censored by traditional media are
readily available online in their original format and may be seen to play a role in effectively
inspiring the radicalised at home and abroad, while demonstrating the consequences of
dissent to those already living under its regime. The quantity of images published online may
also act to normalise these acts of terror, desensitising potential perpetrators from consider-
ing these actions abnormal and extreme.
Although the longer-term impact of ISIL’s campaign of hard power in cyberspace has yet
to be fully analysed, there are already examples of how effective a soft power campaign can
be on a receptive audience that is technologically literate and with a wide individual
ownership of devices capable of receiving the message. Barak Obama’s use of social media
as a tool of soft power proved particularly noteworthy in the 2008 presidential campaign.
In the previous 10 years US broadband Internet access had doubled to 55 per cent and social
networking technologies had matured, technology which Obama’s team fully exploited and
placed at the centre of their strategy. Although all the candidates hoping for the Democratic
party nomination had websites, he made better use of Twitter, text messages and Facebook to
proactively engage with his supporters in publicising his message, gaining supporters and
fund raising (Talbot, 2008).
At an international level, the House of Lords’ committee on soft power noted that a
country’s cultural reputation is seen as being an important element in the projection of power
and inﬂuence, with the role of national broadcasters particularly emphasised. In this respect
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was seen as a unique strength for the United
Kingdom predominantly due to its perceived independence from the Government, its
international services and the dominance of the English language worldwide (House of
Lords, 2014a). In particular, during his evidence to the committee, Nye stated that in an
information age soft power relies on communication and that it was not just whose army
wins, but also whose story wins that matters in exercising power (House of Lords, 2014b).
However, the power of the message may be lost if it is seen as promoting a speciﬁc national
message and the committee concluded that fundamental to gaining the trust of others and
promoting a sympathetic view of the United Kingdom is to promote characteristics that have
broad appeal. These must have attributes that are intrinsically linked to the United Kingdom,
yet are seen to be independent of government interference. Evidence of the power of the
BBC was noted by the committee in their ﬁnal report by making speciﬁc reference to the
alleged jamming by the Iranian authorities of the satellite signal broadcasting its content
(House of Lords, 2014a).
An integral component of any campaign to inﬂuence behaviour is an understanding by the
target of the originator and their intentions. This may be clear when faced with military force
or a radio broadcast announcing its origin, but may be erroneous if it is part of a deception
plan. However, as Rid (2011) notes, quoting Clausewitz’s statement as war being an
extension of politics, attribution will always follow at some point in a conﬂict. Within
The projection and measurement of cyberpower
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cyberspace though, attribution may not be straightforward and misinformation is rife. Social
media in particular has been noted as providing an environment in which individuals have
been deceived, sometimes with devastating personal consequences (Tsikerdekis and
Zeadally, 2014). Established media organisations and democratic governments with an
online presence strive to ensure the credibility of all information that they broadcast and that
it is not perceived as state-sponsored propaganda. To achieve this, it must be truthful and
open to corroboration, clearly attributable to the source and sensitive to local cultures and
religions (Nye, 2008). However, despite the efforts of reputable news organisations to
disseminate information, which to the best of their knowledge is unbiased and neutral, the
mass of conﬂicting information online can be problematic. Bastardi et al (2011) illustrated
that what people believed to be true and what they wish to be true can be very different with
people evaluating evidence in a biased manner. Examples demonstrated that where political
convictions are challenged by scientiﬁc studies, people derogate from the methodology used
or interpret the results differently to ﬁt their preconceived beliefs.
In order to be able to inﬂuence a target audience, it is necessary to have not only a
compelling message, but also access to the target’s network infrastructure for its
dissemination. As noted by the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), which seeks to identify and
document Internet ﬁltering and surveillance, network resilience is becoming an increas-
ingly important factor (opennet.net, 2014). In particular, the ONI notes that the content of
social media applications has attracted the attention of governments around the world and
some have sought to block selected elements of the sites or even shut off access entirely to
those that contain politically or socially sensitive content. An understanding of both the
level of censorship a target audience is subject to and their awareness of methods such as
proxies to circumvent them are an important aspect in any attempt to project power
through cyberspace.
Measuring the Effect of Cyberpower
Because of the inconsistency in how people interpret information and the potential bias in
how it may be understood, the House of Lords committee (2014a) echoed Nye (2010) in
noting that soft power cannot be applied instantaneously, but that it is a long-term activity
that must be carefully planned and implemented (House of Lords, 2014a). Inﬂuence and
afﬁnity cannot be easily quantiﬁed and attempts to do so may result in measuring only those
aspects that can be more easily identiﬁed as discrete variables and not the more abstract
elements such as the effect of the message. Some matrices can be identiﬁed however, such as
those used in Obama’s successful Presidential election campaign, which were measured not
only in terms of monetary donations, but also through comparing the numbers of Twitter
followers of each candidate, which provided a direct indication of relative popularity as did
MySpace ‘friends’ and Facebook supporters (Talbot, 2008). Trends in web trafﬁc and
Internet searches also provided indicators as to how the campaign was progressing towards
the all-important primaries. In addition to purely just measuring the number of followers in
Twitter, other methods have been used to determine the spread and impact of a message.
Research by Cha et al (2010) has shown that the use of hashtags that identify certain topics as
well as mentions and retweets can provide a more reliable indication of the inﬂuence of the
originator than comparing just the number of followers.
Venables et al
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The use of social media in which users actively interact with the application by posting
their own messages and engaging with others’ readily lends itself to quantitative analysis.
However, methods also exist to measure user engagement with other methods of
communication such as websites in which there may be no direct data input. Many of the
techniques that can be applied to the measurement of a soft power message can be taken
from the domain of Internet commerce in which website visits are recorded and analysed
with the aim of optimising the user experience and increasing sales. Google analytics is a
facility that provides information about a website’s trafﬁc and measures the number of
visits that results in actual sales. It can record in real time for later analysis how and
from where the user accessed the site, such as from search engines or social media, and
tracks their interaction with the pages while logging what material is downloaded
(Google Analytics, 2014). Since July 2014, Twitter has also provided a powerful facility
to investigate the use of its platform with its own analytics function that allows users
to discover who has viewed their Tweets and provides an overview of their proﬁles
(Twitter Analytics, 2014). Also commonly used by websites to aid their analysis of user
activity is the use of ‘cookies’, which are small non-executable harmless text ﬁles,
downloaded by web servers onto the devices accessing their websites. These can then be
used to provide user identiﬁcation of the machine, record revisits, track browsing habits
and tailor the user experience accordingly. By measuring the number of visits and tracking
browsing habits within the site, ongoing and repeat interest in its contents can then be
gauged (Jegatheesan, 2013).
Although both widely used, Google analytics and cookies do require the acquiescence of
the user in allowing the use of scripting languages embedded in the websites to be executed
by their browser and permitting cookies to be downloaded. An alternative method, which is
purely server based, utilises monitoring software that tracks the mouse clicks and informa-
tion requests of visitors to a website (Kent et al, 2011). This records which pages have been
most accessed, what type of information is of most interest and the path that users take as
they navigate its pages and the time spent on each one. Web analytics software places no
information onto the visitors’ computers and no personal information is collected. It is
becoming regarded as an essential component of those with a commercial web presence, and
although designed and primarily used as a method of optimising the web experience of
potential customers, it has a potential use as a means of measuring the reaction to material
designed to spread a soft power message.
In addition to the methods used in optimising online commerce, there are also other
means available that could theoretically be used to project and measure the spread of soft
power. These originate from techniques used by the creators of malware and involve
activities that could be regarded as straying into the realm hard power and would have
signiﬁcant legal and ethical constraints in their use. These draw on the methods used by
botnets to deliberately infect a target computer with executable code, which would then
report back to a command and control server. This could be achieved by the victim
clicking on a link within a website to download the code, or even by conducting a ‘drive-
by’ attack by just visiting a speciﬁcally designed page containing the malware using a
browser conﬁgured to grant access to scripting languages (Barwinski, 2005). This
spyware’s role could be as simple as reporting usage such as sites visited and material
downloaded, but it could also be used for a range of other activities more commonly
associated with malware, such as harvesting user credentials and directing users to fake
The projection and measurement of cyberpower
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websites feeding false information or even rendering the machine itself inoperable. These
different tracking methods are summarised in Table 3.
All these methods are mature technologies and their ongoing development and current use
would be driven by the commercial need to understand how users interact with online
commerce or, in the case of the ﬁnal method, for illicit purposes. Botnets were ﬁrst recorded
in 1999 and have increased in complexity and sophistication to avoid detection; as a result
end users may not even be aware of their existence within their computers. This may
particularly be the case if their signatures are not included within the anti-virus software in
use and the communication to their command and control server remain unnoticed (Gassen
and Gerhards-Padilla, 2012).
The techniques used in commercial advertising to attract customers and increase revenue
have distinct parallels with the desire of both state and non-state actors to inﬂuence the
behaviour of a population as part of a strategy to project cyberpower. Both are intended to
alter the perception of their targets in order to conduct activities to the beneﬁt of the
originator. Advertising is the ultimate in soft power – the power of attraction and imitation
with coercion and deterrence being an option used by those with a culture, doctrine or
religion to promote. If detected, the employment of malware to harvest information or direct
users to alternate sites would be seen as a provocative act by the target and depending on the
nature of the information disseminated and the political situation at the time may be seen as
an aggressive or possibly even a hostile act.
Conclusion
The pursuit of power has the ultimate aim of being able to control the behaviour and actions
of another, even if it is against their will. Traditionally, at the state level this has been
considered in terms of hard power using coercion and force with the potential of military
action the ultimate threat. However, with the application of attributed military force yet to be
displayed within cyberspace, the soft power of attraction and imitation has gained interest as
an alternative approach complemented by military force in the physical environment as part
of a coherent smart power strategy. Using cyberspace as the means of projecting soft power
involves both identifying and mapping the networks and infrastructure used to reach the
intended audience as well as the creation of a culturally compelling message. In this article
we have sought to describe a three-dimensional model of cyberspace that can be used to
identify and contextualise all the elements that need to be controlled to enable a target to be
successfully reached. In considering how soft power in cyberspace can be generated and the
means by which it can be delivered, we provide a method by which an assessment can be
Table 3: Methods of measuring web site interaction
Tracking method Where hosted Active or passive Invasive Site redirection
Google analytics Client/server Active Yes No
Cookies Client/server Passive Yes Yes
Web analytics Server Passive No No
Spyware Client Active Yes Yes
Venables et al
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made of its potential success in reaching its intended audience as well as how an adversary’s
campaign can be interrupted.
Developing a soft power campaign is a challenging undertaking as it is requires a deep
understanding of a complex environment and, to be effective, must fulﬁl a range of criteria,
not least in that it must not be seen as state-sponsored propaganda. A key aspect of any
inﬂuence activity in cyberspace is a measurement of the penetration of the message within
the target audience and their response to it. Human factors play an important part as unless
the message can be accessed, understood and most importantly acted upon by the ﬁnal
recipient of the message, the campaign will have been fruitless. By drawing on well-
established and mature technology designed to legitimately measure website interaction or
illicitly to develop malware we have proposed methods to measure the dissemination and
response to a soft power message in a target population.
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